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The empirical literature ﬁnds mixed evidence on the existence of positive productivity exter-
nalities in the host country generated by foreign multinational companies. We propose a novel
mechanism, which emphasizes the role of local ﬁnancial markets in enabling foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) to promote growth through backward linkages, shedding light on this empirical
ambiguity. In a small open economy, ﬁnal goods production combines the production processes
of foreign and domestic ﬁrms, which compete for skilled labor, unskilled labor, and intermediate
products. In order to operate a ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst
develop a new variety of intermediate good. Innovation and imitation both require capital costs,
which must be ﬁnanced through the domestic ﬁnancial institutions. The more developed the
local ﬁnancial markets are, the easier it is for credit constrained entrepreneurs to start their own
ﬁrms. Thus the number of varieties of intermediate goods increases, causing positive spillovers
to the ﬁnal goods sector. As a result the host country beneﬁts from the backward linkages
between foreign and domestic ﬁrms since the local ﬁnancial markets allow these linkages to
turn into FDI spillovers. Our calibration exercise conﬁrms our analytical results. In particu-
lar, the results show that the same amount of increase in FDI, regardless of the reason of the
increase, generates three times more additional growth in ﬁnancially well-developed countries
than in ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries. The calibration exercise also shows the impor-
tance of the other local conditions such as market structure and human capital–the absorptive
capacities–for the eﬀect of FDI on economic growth.
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There is a widespread belief among policymakers that foreign direct investment (FDI) generates
positive productivity eﬀects for the host countries. The main mechanism for these externalities is the
adoption of foreign technology, which can happen via licensing agreements, imitation, competition
for resources, employee training, knowledge and export spillovers. These beneﬁts, together with
the direct capital ﬁnancing it provides, suggest that FDI can play an important role in modernizing
a national economy and promoting economic development. Yet, the empirical evidence on the
existence of positive productivity externalities is sobering.1
The macro empirical literature ﬁnds weak support for an exogenous positive eﬀect of FDI on
economic growth.2 Recent ﬁndings indicate that a country’s capacity to take advantage of FDI
externalities might be limited by the local conditions, such as development of the local ﬁnancial
markets or the educational level of the country, i.e., absorptive capacities. Borensztein, Gregorio,
and Lee (1998) and Xu (2000) show that FDI brings technology, which translates into higher growth
only when the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Alfaro, Chanda,
Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004), Durham (2004), and Hermes and Lensink (2003) provide evidence
that only countries with well-developed ﬁnancial markets gain signiﬁcantly from FDI in terms of
their growth rates.
The micro empirical literature ﬁnds ambiguous results for the eﬀect of FDI on ﬁrm’s produc-
tivity. This literature comes in three waves. Starting with the pioneering work of Caves (1974),
the ﬁrst generation papers focus on country case studies and industry level cross sectional studies.3
These studies ﬁnd a positive correlation between the productivity of a multinational enterprise
(MNE) and average value added per worker of the domestic ﬁrms within the same sector.4 Then
comes the second generation studies which use ﬁrm level panel data. However, these studies ﬁnd no
eﬀect of foreign presence or ﬁnd negative productivity spillover eﬀects from the MNE to the devel-
oping country ﬁrms.5 The positive spillover eﬀects are found only for developed countries.6 Based
on these negative results, the third generation of studies argue that since multinationals would like
to prevent information leakage to potential local competitors but would beneﬁtf r o mk n o w l e d g e
spillovers to their local suppliers, FDI spillovers ought to be between diﬀerent industries. Hence
1See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998); Gorg and Strobl (2001); Lipsey (2002); Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004);
Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) for excellent surveys of spillover channels and empirical ﬁndings.
2See Carkovic and Levine (2000).
3See Blomstorm (1986), and Moran (2001).
4A multinational enterprise (MNE) is a ﬁrm that owns and controls production facilities or other income-generating
assets in at least two countries. When a foreign investor begins a green-ﬁeld operation (i.e., constructs new production
facilities) or acquires control of an existing local ﬁrm, that investment is regarded as a direct investment in the balance
of payments statistics. An investment tends to be classiﬁed as direct (FDI) if a foreign investor holds at least 10%
of a local ﬁrm’s equity. This arbitrary threshold is meant to reﬂect the notion that large stockholders, even if they
do not hold a majority stake, will have a strong say in a company’s decisions and participate in and inﬂuence its
management. Hence, to create, acquire or expand a foreign subsidiary, the MNE’s undertake FDI. In this paper, we
often refer to the MNE and FDI interchangeably.
5See Aitken and Harrison (1999), Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002), Keller and Yeaple (2003).
6Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) ﬁnd positive spillovers from foreign to local ﬁrms in a panel data set of ﬁrms
in the UK; Gorg and Strobl (2002) ﬁnd that foreign presence reduces exit and encourages entry by domestic-owned
ﬁrms in the high-tech sector in Ireland.
1one must look for the existence of vertical (inter-industry) externalities instead of horizontal (intra-
industry) externalities. This means the externalities from FDI will manifest themselves through
forward or backward linkages, i.e., contacts between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and
their multinational clients in downstream sectors (backward linkage) or between foreign supplier
of intermediate inputs and their domestic clients in upstream sectors (forward linkage).7 Javorcik
(2004) and Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) ﬁnd evidence for the existence of backward link-
ages between the downstream suppliers and the MNE in Lithuania and in Venezuela, Chile, Brazil
respectively. These results are consistent with FDI spillovers between diﬀerent industries.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First in a theoretical framework we formalize the mecha-
nism through which FDI leads to a higher growth rate in the host country via backward linkages,
which is consistent with the micro evidence found by Javorcik (2004) and Alfaro and Rodriguez-
Clare (2004). The mechanism depends on the extent of the development of the local ﬁnancial
sector. Financial markets act as a channel for the linkage eﬀect to be realized and create positive
spillovers, which is consistent with the macro literature cited above that shows the importance of
absorptive capacities. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w em o d e las m a l lo p e ne c o n o m yw h e r eﬁnal goods production
combines the production processes of foreign and domestic ﬁrms. Both types of ﬁrms employ do-
mestically supplied unskilled labor, skilled labor, and domestically produced intermediate goods
to produce their respective outputs. The intermediate goods are characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz-
Ethier love of variety production function. Production of intermediate goods is carried out by local
entrepreneurs in a monopolistically competitive market. In order to be able to operate a ﬁrm in
the intermediate good sector, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst engage in R&D to develop a new variety of
intermediate goods. In a developing country context R&D can be thought as the imitation and
adaptation process or simply a setup cost. This setup process in the intermediate good sector
requires upfront capital expenditures which must be ﬁnanced by borrowing from domestic ﬁnancial
institutions. If the local ﬁnancial markets are developed enough, credit constrained entrepreneurs
will start their own ﬁrms. This process increases the number of varieties of intermediate goods
thereby generating positive spillover eﬀects to the ﬁnal good sector. In other words, in our model
more FDI increases the demand for intermediate goods, and well-developed ﬁnancial markets ease
the cost constraint for fulﬁlling this increased demand. Our model also implies the existence of
horizontal spillovers in the ﬁnal good sector since the greater availability of intermediate inputs not
only beneﬁts the foreign ﬁrms but also raises the total factor productivity of domestic ﬁrms thus
creating a horizontal spillover as an indirect result of the backward linkage.8
In the second half of the paper, we use the formal model to quantitatively gauge how the
7Hirschman (1958) argues that the linkage eﬀects are realized when one industry may facilitate the development of
another by easing conditions of production in the other, thereby setting the pace for further rapid industrialization.
He also argues that in the absence of linkages, foreign investments could have limited or even negative eﬀect in an
economy (the so called enclave economies).
8Like Hirschman (1958), we view linkages here as pecuniary externalities. In contrast to knowledge spillovers,
pecuniary externalities take place through market transactions. In our model, linkages are associated with pecuniary
externalities in the production of inputs. The existence of such pecuniary externalities has been noted by Barba
Navaretti and Venables (2004, p.41). Hobday (1995), in a case study of developing East Asia, ﬁnds many situations
in which MNEs investment created backward linkages eﬀects to local suppliers.
2response of growth to FDI varies with the level of development of the ﬁnancial markets. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is unique in this respect. We ﬁnd that a) for the same share of
foreign production in total output, countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets exhibit growth
rates that are at least twice as high, and b) when we consider an increase in the amount of FDI
(or the technology gap between foreign-owned ﬁrms and domestically owned ﬁrms), the increase
in the growth rate of total output is much higher for more ﬁnancially developed countries. These
results hold for two alternative sources of increase in the extent of MNE presence in the economy;
namely, an increase on account of improvements in the productivity of foreign ﬁrms or an increase
on account of increases in the share of foreign production.9 Numerically, the results show that
for the same magnitude of increase in the foreign presence the additional growth eﬀects generated
in the ﬁnancially well-developed countries is three times that of those generated in the ﬁnancially
poorly-developed countries.
The calibration section also shows the importance of local conditions such as market structure
and human capital, the so-called absorptive capacities, for the eﬀect of FDI on economic growth.
For example, by changing the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by domestic ﬁrms
and MNEs, we ﬁnd that growth eﬀects are much higher when they are substitutes rather than
complements. By varying the relative skill ratios while assuming that MNEs use skilled labor more
intensively, we obtain results that are consistent with the empirical papers such as Borensztein,
Gregorio, and Lee (1998) that highlighting the critical role of human capital. Overall our analysis
is unique in the sense that it is consistent with both micro and macro empirical evidence.
Theoretical models of FDI spillovers via backward linkages include Rodriguez-Clare (1996),
Markusen and Venables (1999), and Lin and Saggi (2006).10 None of these models investigate the
critical role played by local ﬁnancial markets. Also they do not focus on the growth eﬀects of FDI
spillovers. Instead, these are static models. Our model closely follows Grossman and Helpman’s
(1990, 1991) small open economy setup of endogenous technological progress resulting from the
innovation in the intermediate goods sector. We modify their basic framework to incorporate
foreign ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediation. The standard Grossman-Helpman setting is preferred
since it provides the most transparent solution and interpretation of our hypothesis. Gao (2005) also
incorporates FDI into a growth model that closely follows Grossman and Helpman (1991). He does
not model the role of domestic ﬁnancial markets in allowing FDI beneﬁts to materialize nor relate
the model to the empirical evidence. Recently, Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) have
modeled technology transfers with imperfect ﬁnancial markets in a Schumpeterian growth model.
Their model is diﬀerent than ours in the sense that they focus on credit constraints impeding
international technology transfers (and hence international convergence) while we focus on the role
of credit constraints in allowing linkages between multinational ﬁrms and local suppliers in the host
country to materialize and are thus more concern e dw i t hl i n k a g e sw i t h i na ne c o n o m yo n c eF D Ih a s
9This increase in foreign presence is either exogenously imposed or endogenously created, depending on the
production function speciﬁcations, as will be made clear in the below discussions.
10Rodriguez-Clare (1996) assumes perfect competition in the ﬁnal good; Markusen and Venables (1999) allows for
competition eﬀects between local and foreign ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sector. Lin and Saggi (2006) study the role of
contractual relationships between foreign ﬁrms and local suppliers.
3taken place.
The importance of well-functioning ﬁnancial institutions in augmenting technological innovation
and capital accumulation, fostering entrepreneurial activity and economic development has been
recognized and extensively discussed in the literature.11 Furthermore, as McKinnon (1973) stated,
the development of capital markets is “necessary and suﬃcient” to foster the “adoption of best-
practice technologies and learning by doing.” In other words, limited access to credit markets
restricts entrepreneurial development. In this paper, we extend this view and argue that the lack of
development of local ﬁnancial markets can limit the economy’s ability to take advantage of potential
FDI spillovers.12 Our results on the importance of the ﬁnancial markets can also be interpreted
more generally as the importance of the local policies and institutions in limiting the potential
beneﬁts that FDI can provide to the host country. For example, lack of adequate contract and
property rights enforcement can limit the interaction between foreign and local ﬁrms. A foreign
ﬁrm can decide instead of buying inputs in the host country to produce them within the boundaries
of the ﬁrm or import them restricting their local activities to hiring labor.13 Furthermore, our paper
relates to the much broader literature that studies the role played by ﬁnancial markets in allowing
the beneﬁts of globalization to materialize.14
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 performs
a calibration exercise using estimated values for the parameter values from the empirical literature.
Section 4 discusses possible extensions and alternative frameworks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Consider a small open economy. The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents





where u(.) is a continuously diﬀerentiable strictly concave utility function, ρ i st h et i m ep r e f e r e n c e
parameter, and Cs denotes consumption of the ﬁnal good at time s.T h eﬁnal good is a numeraire
a n di sf r e e l yt r a d e di nw o r l dm a r k e t sa tap r i c ept normalized at 1. The total expenditure on
11Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), followed by Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jo-
vanovic (1990), and King and Levine (1993b), among others, have shown that well-functioning ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t s ,b y
lowering the costs of conducting transactions, ensure capital is allocated to the projects that yield the highest returns,
and therefore enhance growth rates.
12Following Intel’s construction of a semiconductor assembly plant in Costa Rica in 1996, local software production
in Costa Rica increased dramatically. However, producers and potential entrepreneurs in the software sector contin-
uously complain that a lack of funds resources and/or the high cost of available ﬁnancing hinder the growth of the
sector and its ability to compete in the international arena. See Spar (1998), Hanson (2001), Larrain, Lopez-Calva
and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), and Perez (2000).
13See Antras (2003), and Lin and Saggi (2006).
14See for example Aghion, Bacchetta and Ranciere (2006) and Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2005).







e−rswsds + A0 (2)
where A0 denotes the value of the assets held by the household at s =0 ,a n d ws is the wage income.
The intertemporal budget constraint requires that the present value of the expenditures, Et not
exceed the present value of labor income plus the value of asset holdings in the initial period. The
solution of this standard problem implies that the value of the expenditures must grow at a rate
equal to the diﬀerence between the interest rate and the discount rate.15 However if this rate of
growth of expenditure is diﬀerent from the endogenous rate of growth of the economy then either
the transversality condition is violated or the economy no longer remains a small open economy.
To rule out these possibilities, we assume that households are credit constrained and can borrow at
most a ﬁxed fraction of their current income. Further, we assume that this constraint is binding,








This is only an assumption of convenience since as we will see later the entrepreneurs are also
credit-constrained and we’d rather treat both the same. Also this assumption ensures that the
consumption side of the economy has no implications for the production side. Hence there is no
diﬀerence between assuming a household cannot borrow forever and a household cannot borrow
over a certain fraction.
2.2 Production
2.2.1 The Final Good Sector
Final good production combines the production processes of domestic and foreign ﬁrms denoted
respectively by Yd and Yf . The foreign and domestic goods themselves are not traded. Let pd and
pf denote the prices for Yd and Yf.






where ρ ≤ 1 and ε =1 /(1 − ρ) represents the elasticity of substitution between Yd and Yf. We do
not model the decision of foreign ﬁrms to enter the market, i.e., we abstract from the determinants
of FDI. The aggregator of foreign and domestic ﬁrm production therefore serves as an artifact
that will allow us to capture several features related to the composition and interaction of foreign
15Since the economy has access to the international capital markets, equilibrium conditions require that rather




condition is automatically guaranteed by the restriction imposed by the intertemporal budget constraint. Note that
our economy is a one good economy and hence the discussion of trade balance is arguably immaterial.
5and domestic ﬁr m si na ne c o n o m y . 16 In addition, this simple setup, allows us to emulate diﬀerent
interaction between domestic and foreign ﬁrms (as complements or substitutes for example) via
competition in the local markets or diﬀerent consumer preferences.17 If ε =1 /(1 − ρ)=∞, foreign
and domestic ﬁrms produce perfect substitutes; ε =1 /(1 − ρ)=−∞, both sectors would be
complements. If ε =1 /(1 − ρ)=1 , we proxy a Cobb Douglas production function.

























which allows us to derive an expression between the price of the domestic ﬁrm and foreign ﬁrm







2.2.2 Foreign and Domestic Firms Production Processes in the Final Good Sector
Both foreign and domestic ﬁrms production processes combine unskilled labor and skilled labor
(human capital) together with a composite intermediate good. The intermediate good is assembled
from a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated goods. Labor, unskilled and skilled (human capital),
are not traded and available in a ﬁxed quantity L and H, correspondingly. Competition in the
labor market ensures that unskilled and skilled wages, wu and ws, are equal to their respective
16Our preferred view is one where foreign and domestic ﬁrms are producing diﬀerent goods in the ﬁnal good sector
which could be complements or substitutes. However, as we do not model the foreign ﬁrm’s decision to enter the
domestic market, we prefer the above assumption since this setup allows us to vary μ and relative productivities








. Therefore the share is endogenous and will approach μ/(1 + μ) in the limit as ρ → 0 (the Cobb
Douglas case). In addition, diﬀerent assumptions regarding the elasticity of substitution allows us to model foreign
and domestic sectors as complements or substitutes. For diﬀerent applications of a similar setup see Acemoglu (1998)
and Devereux and Engel (2005).
17More generally, we could model diﬀerent preferences for domestic and foreign produced goods. However our
setup has the further advantage of dissociating the production side of the economy from preferences. Since there is no
systematic evidence of whether consumers preferences should be biased towards the domestic ﬁrm’s good or the MNC’s
good, we’d rather abstract from this issue. In section 4 we explore the case of both goods being perfect substitutes.
Also, explicitly modelling diﬀerent market interaction between domestic and foreign ﬁrms would complicate the model
without adding further insights to the results.
6marginal products. To capture the importance of proximity between suppliers and users of inputs,
we assume that all varieties of intermediate goods are non-traded.18







with 0 <β d < 1, 0 <γ d < 1, 0 <λ<1 and βd + γd + λ =1 .L t,d denotes the amount of unskilled
labor used in the domestic production in period t, Ht,d is the skilled labor used in the domestic
production in period t, It,d is the amount of composite intermediate goods used in the domestic
production in period t and Ad represents the time invariant productivity parameter.
Foreigners directly produce in the country rather than license the technology. The industrial
organization literature suggests that ﬁrms engage in FDI not because of diﬀerences in the cost
of capital but because certain assets are worth more under foreign than local control. If lower
cost of capital were the only advantage a foreign ﬁrm had over domestic ﬁrms, it would still
remain unexplained why a foreign investor would endure the troubles and headaches of operating
a ﬁrm in a diﬀerent political, legal, and cultural environment instead of simply making a portfolio
investment. In addition, evidence shows that investors often fail to bring all the capital with them
when they take control of a foreign company; instead, they tend to ﬁnance an important share of
their investment in the local market.19
An investor’s decision to acquire a foreign company or build a plant instead of simply exporting
or engaging in other forms of contractual arrangements with foreign ﬁrms involves two interrelated
aspects: ownership of an asset and the location to produce.20 First, a ﬁrm can possess some
ownership advantage — a ﬁrm-speciﬁc asset such as a patent, technology, process, or managerial or
organizational know-how — that enables it to outperform local ﬁrms. And this is one of the reasons
why researchers fail to ﬁnd evidence of horizontal spillovers since this means that a foreign ﬁrm
will seek to use this special asset to its advantage and prevent leakages of its technology. Hence, we
model potential beneﬁts from FDI as occurring via linkages and not through technology spillovers.
Second, locational factors, such as opportunities to tap into local resources, providing access to
low-cost inputs or low-wage labor, or bypass tariﬀs that protect a market from imported goods
can also lead to the decision to invest in a country rather than serve the foreign market through
exports.21 Since our objective in this paper is to understand the eﬀects of foreign production on
local output and the role of ﬁnancial markets, and not the decision to invest abroad, we model
these frictions of doing business in the domestic economy with the function φ.22
18Non-tradability of inputs is only an extreme way to capture transportation costs in the model. This is a standard
assumption in these models. See Markusen and Venables (1999), Javorcik (2004), Overman, Redding and Venables
(2001) and Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) for a discussion and the empirical relevance of this assumption.
19See Graham and Krugman (1991), Kindleberger (1969), and Lipsey (2003).
20This approach to the theory of the multinational ﬁrm is also known as the OLI framework (ownership advantage,
localization, internalization. See Dunning (1981).
21For models that endogenize the FDI decision see Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984) and Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2004).
22Burnstein and Monge-Naranjo (2005) assume taxes on foreign ﬁrms to be the policy barrier in each country. We
follow a broader interpretation, as foreign ﬁrms need to compensate for a wide range of costs/risks of doing business










with 0 <β f < 1, 0 <γ f < 1, and βd + γd + λ =1 . Like before, Lt,f denotes the domestic labor
useed in the foreign production in period t, Ht,f is the domestic skilled labor used in the foreign
production in period t, It,f is the amount of composite intermediate goods used in the foreign
production in period t, Af represents the productivity parameter. Finally we allow for unskilled
and skilled labor to have diﬀerent shares within the domestic and foreign production though the
total labor share is the same across both. This reﬂects the common observation that the share of
labor tends to be around one third of total factor payments while still allowing us to have diﬀerent
skill intensities within domestic and foreign production. A corollary of assuming the same total
labor share is,
γf − γd = βd − βf. (8)
Lastly, the composite intermediate good is assembled from diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs.
Following Ethier (1982), we assume that, for a given aggregate quantity of intermediate inputs used
in the ﬁnal good production, output is higher when the diversity in the set of inputs used is greater.23
This speciﬁcation captures the productivity gains from increasing degrees of specialization in the
production of ﬁnal goods.







where xt,i is the amount of each intermediate good i used in the production of the ﬁnal good at
time t,a n dn is the number of varieties available. Let pi denote the price of a variety i of the
intermediate good x. The CES speciﬁcation imposes constant and equal elasticity of substitution
between a pair of goods.24 Since the use of each intermediate good does not aﬀect the productivity
of the others and since there is decreasing marginal productivity of each intermediate good, the
ﬁr mw i l lu s ea l lt h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d si nt h es a m eq u a n t i t y ,t h u sxt,i = xt.L e tXt = nxt be the
total input of intermediate goods employed in the production of the ﬁnal good at time t,t h e nw e
can rewrite It = n
1−α
α






















abroad including institutions, sovereign risk, taxes, infrastructure in the country, etc.
23The intermediate goods sector uses the functional form introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1978), which is proposed
as a speciﬁcation for a utility function and later applied to production theory by Ethier (1982).
24The elasticity of substitution is given by ε =1 /(1 − α).
8Thus raising the varieties of intermediate inputs n, holding the quantity of intermediate goods
constant, raises output productivity. The reason is that bigger n allows the ﬁrm to use less of each
one since inputs are imperfect substitutes, and this raises the average product for the part of the
production that uses the intermediate good. This property of the production function is commonly
referred to as love of variety for inputs.25
Equilibrium conditions require the unit cost to be equal to the price. Using the cost function
and the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium all intermediate goods are priced similarly, pi = px,





























2.2.3 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition.26 There exists an
inﬁnite set of potential varieties of these goods, but only a subset of varieties is produced at any point
in time as entrepreneurs are required to develop a new variety. Since the set of potential intermediate
goods is unbounded and all such products are symmetric, an entrepreneur will never choose to
develop an already existing variety. Therefore, variety i of x is produced by a single ﬁrm which then
chooses the price pi to maximize proﬁts. Firms take as given the price of competing intermediate
inputs, the price of the ﬁnal good and the price of the factors of production. In a symmetric
equilibrium all intermediate goods are priced similarly, pi = px. Hence, proﬁt maximization in
every time period for each supplier of variety i implies:
max πi = pxxi − cx(wu,w s,x i)xi (14)
where cx(wu,w s,x i) represents the cost function and xi = xd + xf, is the sum of the demand for
the intermediate product i by domestic and foreign ﬁrms respectively.





Hence, the cost function for the monopolist is given by:
c(wu,w s,x i)=δ−δ(1 − δ)−(1−δ)wδ
uw(1−δ)
s x (16)
25Ethier (1982) ascribes this property of the technology to the gains from increasing degrees of specialization in
production.
26In our model, intermediate suppliers can exist with a large domestic sector but little or no FDI. In later stages of
development this can be beneﬁcial since the MNE’s might seek out countries where it is easier to ﬁnd all the inputs
locally. See Blomstrom (1986) for related evidence that countries with large domestic sectors attract more FDI.
9Proﬁt maximization yields the result that each variety is priced at a constant markup (1/α)
over the marginal cost. Hence, the price of each intermediate good is given by,27






The fraction that domestic ﬁrms spends on all intermediate goods is given by the corresponding
share in the production function, λpdYd. This implies that for each intermediate good, the amount




















[λpdYd + λpfYf] (21)
What is the value of introducing new intermediate goods and thus the value of the monopolistic
ﬁrm? Let vt denote the value of a claim to the inﬁnite stream of proﬁts at time t. The present
discounted value of an inﬁnite stream of proﬁts for a ﬁrm that supplies intermediate goods at time





Equity holders of the ﬁrm are entitled to the stream of future proﬁts of the ﬁrm. They make an
instantaneous return of (πt +
.
v),( p r o ﬁts and capital gain). They can also invest the same amount
in a risk free bond and receive return rvt (the prevailing market interest rate). Arbitrage in capital
markets ensures that,






Thus the rate of return of holding ownership shares is equal to the interest rate.28
27See Helpman and Krugman (1985), chapter 6.
28Note that the arbitrage condition does not contradict our assumption of credit-constrained households since they
can choose to lend to ﬁrms or invest in a risk free bond.
102.2.4 Introduction of New Varieties and Financial Markets
In order to run a ﬁrm in the intermediate good sector, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst develop a new
variety of intermediate goods. Since this is a small open economy, innovative activities do not
aﬀect conditions abroad. The development of each new variety requires the use of capital according





In contrast to Grossman and Helpman (1991), who assume that new varieties are developed
with two inputs, labor and general knowledge, we opt for one input only, capital, to simplify the
analysis.29 Our main results do not depend on this simplifying assumption. The main implication
of this simpliﬁcation is that our results are less dependent on the production parameters of the
innovation sector. This has important advantages for our calibration exercise as the stylized facts
of the innovation and imitation process are not well documented, limiting our range of parameters.
Our central argument is that entrepreneurs in developing economies face diﬃculties in obtaining
loans to set up ﬁrms and this chokes the creation of backward linkages even under the presence
of FDI. Assuming only capital is used for these setup costs then allows us to focus better on this
issue.
The introduction of a new variety depends on the existing stock of varieties. We introduce the
parameter θ since this will help us to introduce the growth in capital stock in terms of the eﬃciency
units and also let us have a more general production structure as argued by Jones (1995). At this
point, we only postulate that θ is greater than zero. As we shall see later, whether it is actually less
than one (increasing complexity in introducing new varieties) or greater than one (“standing on
the shoulder of giants”) will be pinned down by the balanced growth path requirements.30 Finally,
a can be viewed as the level of eﬃciency in the innovative sector.
Innovation in the intermediate good sector requires capital costs which must be ﬁnanced by
borrowing from the domestic ﬁnancial institutions. Entrepreneurs will engage in the production of
intermediate goods only if the present value of the stream of monopoly proﬁts of operating a ﬁrm in
the intermediate good sector are greater than the capital costs of innovating. The domestic ﬁnancial
system intermediates resources at an additional cost.31 This cost reﬂects the level of development of
the domestic ﬁnancial markets where lower levels of development are associated with higher costs.
The cost manifests itself in a higher borrowing rate, i which is greater than the lending rate, r.A s
King and Levine (1991) mention, this wedge could reﬂect taxes, interest ceilings, required reserve
policies, or high intermediation costs due to labor regulation, high administration costs, etc.32 This
simpliﬁcation allows us to focus on the main theme of the paper: the role of ﬁnancial markets in
29Grossman and Helpman (1991) assume that the greater the stock of general knowledge among the scientiﬁc
community, the smaller the input of human capital needed to invent a new product. They assume
.
n = KL/a, where
K represents the stock of general knowledge capital, and not physical capital like in our model. Hence, in our model
the R&D sector does not compete for labor inputs against the ﬁnal good sector.
30In equilibrium θ must be diﬀerent than one to get a balanced growth path.
31See Edwards and Vegh (1997) for a similar setup.
32Galor and Zeira (1993) adopt a similar strategy to allow for capital market imperfections.
11allowing FDI beneﬁts to materialize. Thus, this assumption should be regarded as a shortcut to
more complex modelling of the ﬁnancial sector.33 The reader is referred to the appendix for a cost
veriﬁcation approach following King and Levine (1993b) that yields the similar implications. Our
qualitative results will be the same under this framework.
Given nθ and a, if an entrepreneur wants to introduce one variety at any instant in time, the
amount of capital needed will be K = a/nθ, so that ˙ n =1 .34 Therefore the cost of one variety is
ia
nθ (24)
There is free entry into the R&D sector. Entrepreneurs will have an incentive to enter if ia
nθ <v .
However this condition implies that the demand for capital will be inﬁnite, which cannot be an
equilibrium solution. Hence, we can rule out this condition ex ante. If on the other hand ia
nθ >v ,
entrepreneurs will have no incentive to engage in innovation. This possibility cannot be ruled out
ex ante but would lead to zero growth. Therefore, in equilibrium, if there is growth in the number
of varieties it must be the case that,
ia







i.e., more innovation reduces the value of each ﬁrm. Using this expression and the arbitrage
condition in the capital markets, π
v + ˙ v




















Notice that in the previous equation, ceteris paribus, higher foreign ﬁrm production, Yf increases
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo f ˙ n
n. On the other hand if intermediation costs increase (i goes up), the growth
rate would be lower. In order to simplify, we deﬁne Yd
n1−θ = ˜ Yd and
Yf











This means we can also rewrite equation (4) as,
33There is a broad literature modelling how information and transaction costs can explain the emergence of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Financial institutions can economize on trading costs (Townsend, 1978); pool liquidity risk (Diamond
and Dybig, 1983); acquire information on investment projects (Boyd and Prescott, 1986); and reduce the cost of
monitoring entrepreneurs (Diamond, 1984).
34More generally we can think the cost as
Ψa





















where ˜ K is the capital stock per eﬃciency unit.
2.3 General Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
Substituting the price for intermediate inputs (17) into the equilibrium conditions for the domestic
(12) and foreign production (13), and deﬁning eﬃciency wages for both skilled and unskilled labor












, for the domestic and foreign sector, respectively,

































Equilibrium conditions in the labor market imply that the labor employed by the domestic, the
foreign and the intermediate good production processes add up to the total labor supply in the
economy. This implies, for the skilled and unskilled labor, respectively,
Ld + Lf + nLx = L (32)
Hd + Hf + nHx = H (33)
Using the cost functions for the domestic, foreign and intermediate goods sector and Shepard’s







(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)pdYd
ws
+
(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)pfYf
ws
= H
Using our output and wage equations in terms of eﬃciency units, we can rewrite both constraints
as:



























(i = d,f;j = u,s) should be constant. There are two ways to achieve this. The ﬁrst is to assume
that prices, pi, grow at the rate
³
(1−α)λ
α − (1 − θ)
´
˙ n
n. This would still mean that pd/pf would be
constant since none of these parameters reﬂect sectoral diﬀerences and the relative price would thus
be driven by other factors (mainly ρ and μ). An alternative would be to impose
(1−α)λ
α =1− θ.
This has the disadvantage of being a knife-edge condition but on the other hand it does oﬀer a big
advantage. It allows us to back out θ which may be impossible to get measures of (measures for λ
and α on the other hand are easily available from the literature). This condition still implies that
pd/pf would be constant. Therefore we assume that this condition holds. Thus, we can rewrite the
above as
(βd + δαλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ wu
+
(βf + δαλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ wu
= L (34)
(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ ws
+
(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ ws
= H (35)
Now we can solve for all the endogenous variables completely and derive the equilibrium bal-
anced growth. In order to be able to solve the equilibrium growth rate of varieties, ˙ n
n we need to
solve the set of prices {pd,p f, ˜ wu, ˜ ws} and the outputs of the domestic and foreign sectors,
n
˜ Yd, ˜ Yf
o
.
To solve for the prices and the outputs we use equations (4), (5), (30), (31), (34) and (35). These
equations can be solved in a sequential order. The details are presented in appendix. While we
can solve for the FOC’s and derive implicit relationships, because of equation (5) we cannot derive
explicit solutions for the endogenous variables in terms of the parameters. If we restrict ourselves
to the special case of where the aggregator is a Cobb Douglas function, we can solve explicitly for
all the endogenous variables. We turn to this next to get a sense of the qualitative implication of
the model.
2.3.1 The Aggregator as a Cobb Douglas Function























As for the cost function and equilibrium conditions,






























We can solve the model completely, using equations (30), (31), (34), (35), (37), and (38). The








































Ψβ = η (βd + δλ)+( 1− η)(βf + δλ);
Ψγ = η(γd +( 1− δ)λ)+( 1− η)(γf +( 1− δ)λ).
There are a couple of conclusions one can draw from the Cobb-Douglas case: 1) Higher pro-
ductivity of either domestic or foreign ﬁrms raises the growth rate in the economy since all else
being equal a higher Af and a higher Ad both tend to raise growth. Note that the prototype of our
model is a standard product variety endogenous growth model with scale eﬀects. The equation for
˜ wsH above, is increasing in both L and H and also Af and Ad. E s s e n t i a l l ya ni n c r e a s ei na n yo f
these exogenous parameters increases the proﬁts from introducing new intermediate goods and thus
causes the growth rate to rise. 2) The eﬀect of a higher share of foreign production in the economy
on aggregate growth is ambiguous. This happens because of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator, which
keeps the share of domestic and foreign production constant. Thus even if Af increases relative to
Ad (i.e. a higher productivity gap between the domestic and the foreign producer) this will not
increase the share of the foreign producer in the market. This is the clear drawback of using a
Cobb Douglas speciﬁcation. However we can ask the question of what happens as the share of the
foreign producers is increased exogenously, i.e. a decrease in η. This turns out to be ambiguous
since Υ = ηη (1 − η)
(1−η) is a U-shaped function of η which is minimized at η =0 .5. For almost all
countries in the world η>0.5 and for most developed economies it would be near to 1. Therefore,
even if there is a productivity gap between the domestic and the foreign produces, the term Υ,
which is independent of this gap could drive down the growth rates.
The qualitative eﬀect of ﬁnancial markets on economic growth is unchanged irrespective of
whether we look at Cobb-Douglas or the CES case. In both cases (will be shown later), an increase
15in FDI (either through a higher Af (better technology) or through an increase in the exogenous
parameter μ) in the CES case, raises the overall growth rate of the economy. Note that both
CES and Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcations guarantee the co-existence of both ﬁrms in the long-run.
And in the Cobb-Douglas case their relative shares in the economy is ﬁxed. However in the CES
case an increase in Af (if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1), or a rise in μ, will lead
to a reallocation of resources away from the domestic ﬁrm to the foreign ﬁrm. Therefore the
instantaneous eﬀect will be a decline in domestic ﬁrms’ share in output. In the long run, both
domestic and foreign ﬁrms will beneﬁt from the higher growth rate. However this implies that at
least in the short-run the horizontal spillovers in the ﬁnal good sector, which indirectly result from
the backward linkages between the foreign ﬁrm and the intermediate good sector, exists only for
the surviving domestic ﬁrms as opposed to all domestic ﬁrms in the Cobb-Douglas case. This is
an additional contribution of our setup, which can shed light on why empirical studies fail to ﬁnd
evidence of positive horizontal spillovers for developing countries and even ﬁnd negative spillovers
in some cases.
We will turn into the calibration exercise now where by using micro estimates of our parameters
we quantitatively study the comparative static eﬀe c t sw eh a v ed i s c u s s e ds of a r .
3 Calibration Exercise
In order to illustrate the qualitative properties of the model, we undertake a calibration exercise
using values for the parameters from micro-econometric studies. Then we compute the growth rates
implied by our model. The purpose of this exercise is to study the quantitative growth eﬀects of
FDI, focusing on diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial market development. In the below discussion the main
equations used for the numerical exercise are (4), (5), (30), (31), (28), and (35).
We group countries based on their ﬁnancial market development levels. Diﬀerent measures
have been used in the literature to proxy for ﬁnancial market development.35 The broader ﬁnancial
market development measures such as the monetary-aggregates as a share of GDP and the private
sector credit extended by ﬁnancial institutions as a share of GDP capture the extent of ﬁnancial
intermediation; interest rate spreads, on the other hand, capture the cost of intermediation. Given
that the spread between the lending and borrowing rates better captures the spirit of our model, we
prefer it as the measure for the development of the ﬁnancial markets.36 We ﬁnd that the alternative
measures of ﬁnancial market development, including the size of the ﬁnancial market, the share of
private sector credit in total banking activity, the overhead costs and the interest rate spreads,
are all highly correlated, allowing for using these measures interchangeably.37 The average spread
35See Levine et al. (2000), Erosa (2001).
36Erosa (2001) deﬁnes the ﬁnancial intermediation cost as the resources used up per unit of value that is inter-
mediated, which is the total value of ﬁnancial assets owned by the ﬁnancial institutions. He measures the ﬁnancial
intermediation cost as the spread between the lending and borrowing rates.
37The development of the ﬁnancial markets could alternatively be proxied using broad measures of banking sector
development such as private credit to GDP as in Levine et al. (2000) or stock market variables such as capitalization
to GDP as in Levine and Zervos (1998); or as the overhead costs as a share of total loans, following Imrohoroglu and
Kumar (2003).
16for the low ﬁnancially developed (poor) countries, medium ﬁnancially developed (middle income)
countries and the high ﬁnancially developed (rich) countries between 2000 and 2003 are 14.5%,
8.5%, and 4.5%, respectively.38
The remaining parameters that are used in the benchmark analysis are taken from the liter-
ature. We start by discussing the production parameters. The parameters are chosen such that
those for the domestic ﬁrm capture the characteristics of the production technologies available in
the developing countries; whereas, those for the foreign ﬁrm capture the characteristics of the pro-
duction technologies available in the industrial countries. The share of intermediate goods in the
production of the ﬁnal good (λ) is assumed to be same across the two production technologies.
The formulation of the production technology allows setting the share of the intermediate goods
e q u a lt ot h es h a r eo fp h y s i c a lc a p i t a li nﬁnal production. Following many studies in the literature
we set this share equal to 1/3.39 The remaining 2/3 of ﬁnal production is accounted by skilled and
unskilled labor.
Following Weil (2004) the share of wages paid to human capital (skilled labor) is taken as 49%
for the developing countries, suggesting that of labor’s 2/3rd share in ﬁnal production 49% is due
to the skilled labor. Therefore, we set the share of skilled labor in ﬁnal production, γd, at 32%.
In parallel the share of unskilled labor in ﬁnal production, βd, is set at 35%. As a benchmark
assumption we set the total factor productivity Ad equal to 1.
The share of skilled and unskilled labor in the ﬁnal production by the foreign ﬁrm are calculated
in similar fashion. Following Weil (2004), the share of wages paid to human capital (skilled labor) is
taken as 65% in industrial countries. Accordingly, the share of skilled labor in the ﬁnal production of
the foreign ﬁrm, γf, is set equal to 40%; imputed as 65% of 2/3, the share of labor in ﬁnal production.
Similarly, the share of unskilled labor in the ﬁnal production by the foreign ﬁrm, βf, is set equal
to 0.27. Thus we assume that γf >γ d.40 The productivity of the foreign ﬁrm, Af,i si n i t i a l l ys e t
to be twice that of the domestic ﬁrm following Hall and Jones (1999), who show the productivity
parameter for a very large sample of non-industrial countries is around 45% of the productivity
parameter of the U.S. With respect to the institutional barriers the foreign ﬁrms face, φ,w ec o n s i d e r
a range of parameters from ranging between 1 and 2. Given Af =2 Ad, the overall advantage foreign
ﬁrms have in terms of TFP translates into varying between the range of 2 and 1, corresponding to
the range of values set for the cost of doing business, φ. Therefore our best case scenario is one
where the foreign ﬁrm is twice as productive than domestic ﬁrms even —after considering the cost
to foreign ﬁrms of doing business in a foreign country— and the worst case is where the foreign ﬁrm,
38We also looked into a breakdown into 5 groups, which gives us the same qualitative results.
39See Gollin (2002).
40As Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) note, there is ample evidence that foreign ﬁrms employ more skilled
personnel than domestic ﬁrms. They also tend to be larger, more eﬃcient, and pay higher wages. This could be both
because MNEs bring to host countries a knowledge that may not necessarily be available in the domestic economy
(technologies, management skills, market access and others) or because foreign ﬁrms cherry pick the best ﬁrm or
sectors. When adopting stringent econometric techniques, the diﬀerences between foreign and domestic ﬁrms are
small and not always signiﬁcant. But foreign ﬁr m sa r es t i l lf o u n dt op e r f o r mb e t t e ri ns o m ec a s e sa n dn e v e rw o r s e
than local ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms are also found to pay higher wages than local ﬁrms, even after controlling for skill
diﬀerences and for ﬁrm-speciﬁcf a c t o r s .
17—once additional costs of doing business abroad are considered— has no apparent overall advantage.
The latter scenario may be unrealistic but is a useful benchmark. Finally, given the lack of any
estimate, the share of unskilled labor in the production of the intermediate good δ is taken as 0.5
as benchmark.
The stock of skilled and unskilled labor, H and L respectively, are set to follow Duﬀy, Papa-
georgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004). Duﬀy et al. (2004) discuss the possible aggregation bias
that could be caused by diﬀerences in the contribution to the production in terms of eﬃciency
units of the diﬀerent types of labor. To overcome this bias, they weigh the length of education
by the returns to schooling, and compute what they call “weighted” labor stock data. Taking
the workers that have completed secondary schooling as skilled labor we calculate averages for a
sample of countries in each category of income level according to data availability. Accordingly,
we set the ratio of unskilled labor to skilled labor equal to 12 for the poor countries, 9 for the
middle income countries, and 5 for the rich countries.41 To rule out the possibility of scale eﬀects
driving diﬀerences in growth rates, we assume that H +L =1and the shares of the two factors are
allocated according to these three ratios so that they sum to 1 (e.g. for poor countries H =0 .077
and L =0 .923).
The remaining parameters are α =0 .91,r =0 .05. Based on the work of Basu (1996), the
mark-up is assumed to be 10%, and hence the value of the reciprocal of (1+mark-up) is given by
α =0 .91. The risk free interest rate is assumed to be 5%. The price of the ﬁnal good is taken as
the numeraire. Finally, the parameter capturing the ease of developing new variety of products,
θ, is limited by other parameter choices given the following formulation: θ =1− (λ ∗ (1 − α)/α).
These above discussed parameters are used in both the Cobb-Douglas and the CES exercises, for
which the results are discussed respectively in sections 3.2 and 3.1.
The cost of introducing a new variety of product, a, is taken as the free parameter. In both
cases the model is calibrated to allow for the ﬁnancially well-developed country growth rates to
match the U.S. growth rate. Given the fact that the U.S. is often considered to be the technological
leader one can assume that the productivity of foreign ﬁrms in the U.S. is no diﬀerent than the
productivity of the domestic U.S. ﬁrms, allowing us to assume that Af/(φAd)=1to back out a.
42
In particular, the U.S. growth rate of real GDP was approximately 3.5% for the 70 years of data
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1930-2000), which is the approximate value we try
to achieve in the benchmark case for the ﬁnancially well developed group. This condition and the
other parameters above, pins down a =1 5for the CES production function case, and a =6 0for
the Cobb-Douglas production function case. We use these respective values for the entire analysis
41On average for the Latin American countries, the ratio between the unskilled and skilled workers (L/H)i se q u a l
to 10; for a group of countries that include Latin America, Central America, and the East Asia and Paciﬁcr e g i o nt h e
average increases to 12. The ratio for a sample of developed countries, including the US, European Union economies,
Canada and Japan, is found to be 5.
42Note that we are not assuming that U.S. ﬁrms investing abroad have the same productivity as U.S. ﬁrms that
do not. The work by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) ﬁnds U.S. Multinational be more productive than U.S.
domestic ﬁrms.
18of the CES case and the Cobb-Douglas case, respectively.43 As benchmark, in the Cobb-Douglas
production function case, we assume that the share of the foreign ﬁrms in total output is only 5%
(i.e. η =0 .95). Again this varies considerably by country. Lipsey (2001) estimates that in 1995
the share of world production due to FDI ﬂows was at best 8%. More speciﬁcally at individual
country levels, we ﬁnd for example, that foreign owned companies were responsible for 12% of GDP
in Australia, 5% in Italy, 7% in Finland, 19% in Hungary and 22% in the Czech Republic.44 We
will later consider how our results change when we assume a lower η =0 .75. The share of foreign
production, η is no longer exogenous in the CES production function case; however, the choice of μ
implicitly determines the relative foreign and domestic production. As such, the benchmark value
for μ is determined to allow for the matching of the relative output values to the real data. This
implies that the benchmark value be μ =0 .1.
In our model, ρ relates to the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by foreign
and domestic ﬁrms. Evidence regarding the appropriate choice of the elasticity of substitution
parameter ρ is sparse, given that such depiction of ﬁnal goods production has not been used in
previous models as an artifact to capture the interaction (production/preferences) between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms. The closest evidence is from the literature that depicts the consumption
behavior using a constant elasticity of substitution utility function between varieties of domestic
and foreign goods, or between tradables and nontradables. Ruhl (2005) provides a detailed overview
of the Armingtom elasticity, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between the foreign and home goods,
and ﬁnds that an appropriate value for ρ is around 0.2 and 0.3.45 While the benchmark analysis
below is based on ρ =0 .2 the robustness of the results to diﬀerent values of the elasticity of
substitution is also tested for by allowing the ρ value to range between −0.9 and 0.9.T a b l e 1
summarizes all the parameter values.
We consider two scenarios that reﬂect the beneﬁts of FDI. One scenario is where advances
in innovation in the parent country are transmitted through FDI to the host country. These
technological beneﬁts of FDI are captured through the productivity parameter of the foreign ﬁrm
(i.e, an increase in Af). In considering reasonable increases in Af, we refer to Coe, Helpman and
Hoﬀmaister (1997). Analyzing the spillovers from foreign R&D activity on the Southern total
factor productivities (TFP) Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister (1997) regress the domestic TFP of the
Southern economies on foreign R&D stock, among several other variables. This regression allows
identiﬁcation of the foreign R&D elasticity of TFPs. In the benchmark regression, Coe, Helpman
and Hoﬀmaister (1997) report this elasticity to be at the range of 0.73-0.75.46 We consider the
43Conceivably, since a reﬂects the barriers for entrepreneurs in introducing new blueprints, it may also be a function
of development. However in the absence of any estimates we do not experiment along this line.
44This data comes from Mataloni, Jr. (2005)
45Ruhl (2005) argues that a model that captures both the temporary and permanent shocks, in the case of Ruhl
(2005) these are trade shocks, then one can replicate both the low elasticity of substitution ﬁgures used by the
international real business cycle studies and the high elasticity of substitution values found by the empirical trade
studies. The real elasticity of substitution value depends on which of these shock dominate the system. A wide range
of estimates are available in the literature, the value f or ρ ranging from between 0 and 0.5 (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
2005, and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1994 among others) to values higher than 0.5 (see Head and Reis, 2001,
Hummels and Klenow, 2002, and Romalis, 2005, among others).
46Hejazi and Safarian (1999) adds FDI to Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister’s framework and measures international
19implications of an increase in Af that is 25% (i.e. Af/Ad rises to 2.5). Implicitly this would
reﬂect a 25/0.75 = 33.3% increase in R&D stock of the technological leaders. At ﬁrst glance this
may seem like assuming a rather large increase. On the other hand note that Af in our model is
a constant and therefore this one time jump captures what might realistically happen, perhaps,
over a decade. Alternative measures for the extent of spillovers are obtained from the micro-level
econometric studies. Javorcik (2004) ﬁnds that an approximately 23% increase in foreign direct
investment corresponds to a 15% spillover, which in our framework corresponds to a 15% increase
the relative productivity of foreign ﬁrms.47 In the exercises below we undertake the numerical
calibration of the Cobb-Douglas as well as the CES production function cases following Javorcik’s
ﬁndings(2004), however in the below representation we report the Cobb-Douglas exercise where
there is a 25% increase in Af, and the CES exercise where there is a 15% increase in Af.48
The second scenario is an exogenous increase in FDI share (lower η). Under both of these
scenarios H/L ratios are held ﬁxed for each country, so the resulting diﬀerences in the growth rates
do not reﬂect human capital diﬀerences, rather they reﬂect variations in FDI. Both scenarios are
studied separately for the CES and the Cobb-Douglas production function cases, in sections 3.1
and 3.2, respectively.
3.1 CES Production Function
The benchmark results for the CES production function are reported in table 2. In the case of
CES, the choice of the parameter μ, ceteris paribus, has a positive eﬀect on the share of MNE
production. Given all other parameter values, it turns out that the reasonable choice is μ=0.1,
based on the relative output its value implies. As table 2 suggests, in this case foreign production
equals around 6.5% of domestic production, while when μ =0 .2 t h es a m er a t i oi n c r e a s e st oa r o u n d
15.5%. These two values correspond to the share of foreign production in total production to be
6% and 13%, respectively.49 Following Mattaloni (2005) most of our analysis is restricted around
these two values. However, for the sake of completeness, the tables also list results for increments
spillovers both for trade and FDI. They ﬁnd that much of the measured spillover eﬀect on productivity is through
FDI rather than trade.
47Javorcik (2004) ﬁnds that a one-standard deviation increase in foreign presence, which in her model corresponds
to a 23% increase in FDI, increases domestic production by 15%. A better representation of this correspondence in our
model would be allowing for an increase in the productivity of intermediate goods production, as the Javorcik (2004)
study measures the extent of backward linkages. Given that the mechanics of our model works such that an increase in
the foreign presence, via an improvement in the relative productivity of foreign ﬁrms, increases the demand for locally
produced intermediate goods using the ﬁndings from Javorcik (2004) seems to be a good approximation. Futhermore,
the analysis is repeated for a wide-range of possible spillover magnitudes, not limiting the below discussion to the
choice of the extent of spillovers at neither 25% nor 15%.
48The qualitative results remain unchanged. Due to space limitations and to allow for a wide ranging represen-
tation of the results we report the two alternative spillover magnitudes for the two alternative production function
representations.
49The tables report the ratio of foreign production to domestic production, i.e.
PfYf
PdYd .U s i n g t h e s e s h a r e v a l u e s
it is possible to impute the share of foreign production in total production, i.e.
PfYf
PdYd+PfYF . For example, if foreign
production is 10% of domestic production this corresponds to the share of foreing production in total production
being 9% = 1/(1 + 0.10).
20of 0.1 for μ until μ =0 .6 and as the benchmark value we use μ =0 .1.50
3.1.1 Changes in Relative Productivities and Shares of MNE
The ﬁrst scenario capturing an increase in the foreign presence is an exogenous increase in FDI share
(higher μ). Results in table 3 show that an increase in μ from 0.1 to 0.2 corresponds to a tripling of
the foreign output level, and an increase in foreign production relative to domestic production from
6% to 16%, corresponding to an increase of share of foreign production in total production from 6%
to 13%. Such intensive increase in the extent of foreign presence in the domestic economy generates
additional growth rates that are quantitatively much larger than those discussed below for the case
of improvements in the relative productivity of the foreign ﬁrm. Such an increase in FDI, due to an
increase in μ from 0.1 to 0.2, creates a 1.25 percentage point increase in the average growth rate of
the ﬁnancially well-developed countries, a 0.88 percentage point increase in the average growth rate
of the ﬁnancially medium-developed countries, and a 0.61 percentage point increase in the average
growth rate of the ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries. This ﬁnding is supportive of the main
hypothesis of this paper, that for the same amount of increase in FDI the additional growth rates
that are made possible in ﬁnancially well-developed countries is almost double that of additional
growth rates made possible in ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries.
The results in table 4 are supportive of the hypothesis as well, suggesting that regardless of the
source of the increase in the extent of foreign presence in the local economy, for the same magnitude
of increase in the foreign presence the additional growth eﬀects generated in the local economy are
higher for the ﬁnancially well-developed countries than those generated in the ﬁnancially medium
developed countries, and these are higher than those generated in the ﬁnancially poorly developed
countries. In this case the increase in the extent of foreign presence is captured through an increase
in the relative productivity, Af/(φAd). For the benchmark case, numerically a 15% increase in
the relative productivity of the foreign ﬁrms increases the growth rate of the ﬁnancially well-
developed countries by 0.03 percentage points, increases the growth rate of the ﬁnancially medium-
developed countries by 0.02 percentage points, and increases the growth rate of the ﬁnancially
poorly-developed countries by 0.01 percentage points. The higher relative productivity of the
foreign ﬁrm corresponds to a 4.2% increase in the foreign production, PfYf, and a marginal increase
in the share of foreign production in total production from around 6.1% to 6.3%. These results hold
qualitatively across alternative μ assumptions. For example, if μ =0 .4, in other words if foreign
production is about 37%, a 15% increase in the relative productivity of the foreign ﬁrm generates a
0.35 percentage point increase in the average growth rate of the ﬁnancially well-developed countries,
a 0.24 percentage point increase in the average growth rate of the ﬁnancially medium developed
countries, and a 0.17 percentage point increase in the average growth rate of the ﬁnancially poorly-
developed countries. The corresponding increase in the extent of foreign presence in the local
economy is reﬂected in an 6.6% increase in foreign production, PfYf, and an increase in foreign
50The results reported in the benchmark case provides evidence that the results hold regardless of the choice of the
μ value. We have replicated tables 2 through 9 using μ =0 .2 both the qualitative and quantitative results prevail.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
21production relative to domestic production from 37% to 38%. This ﬁnding is suggestive of a
nonlinearity in the growth eﬀects of FDI, where the additional growth eﬀects increase by a larger
magnitude when the initial level of FDI is higher, suggestive of a convex relationship between the
level of FDI and the additional growth rate generated across each level of ﬁnancial development.
3.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Having established the eﬀects of higher MNE presence along two of the main dimensions and condi-
tional on the development of ﬁnancial markets, we next examine how the potential beneﬁts change
conditional on a number of other parameters or “local conditions”. In particular, in this subsec-
tion, we focus on changes in the cost of doing business (φ), changes in relative skill endowments
across countries (varying H/L), the eﬀects of alternative productivity gaps (based on a number
of contributions in the microeconomic literature), and ﬁnally, varying the elasticity of substitution
( by varying ρ).
Changes in the Cost of Doing Business: While the relative net productivity between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms can change due to the changes in the foreign and the domestic ﬁrms’ gross
productivity, an alternative source of change could be alterations in the cost of doing business,
φ. In table 5, keeping μ =0 .1 and the remaining parameters as in the benchmark case, we allow
for φ to change. We observe that, regardless of the net relative productivity levels, in this case
on account of diﬀerent φ values, an increase in FDI always creates higher additional growth rates
for ﬁnancially more developed countries than in ﬁnancially less developed countries. The extent
of increased foreign presence in table 5 corresponds to a 19% increase in foreign production and
an increase in the share of foreign production in the economy from around 11% to 12%. These
results are evidence that the benchmark ﬁndings are robust to the choice of the cost of doing
business parameter, φ. Therefore, in the remainder of the exercise the choice of keeping φ =1
has no eﬀect on the qualitative results. In fact, results in table 5 is further suggestive that the
quantitative results do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across diﬀerent φ assumptions; for the ﬁnancially
well-developed countries, when the net productivity of the foreign ﬁrm is twice that of the domestic
ﬁrm the additional growth rate increased FDI creates is 0.03 percentage point while when the net
productivity of the foreign ﬁrm is equal to the domestic ﬁrm the the same increase in FDI creates
0.02 percentage point additional growth. The diﬀerence is even smaller for the ﬁnancially medium-
and poorly-developed countries.
Changes in Labor Endowments: The above exercise kept the relative labor endowments con-
stant across the three groups of countries in order to observe the diﬀerences solely on account of
ﬁnancial market development diﬀerences. The three groups however also diﬀer in their relative
labor endowments, as reﬂected in table 1. As such, in table 6 and table 7 we allow for the relative
labor endowments to diﬀer among the three groups, alongside the ﬁnancial market depth. The
diﬀerences in the additional growth rates the same level of FDI generates in the three groups of
countries is even larger, with the main hypothesis of the model holding even stronger. While the
additional growth the same level of FDI creates in the ﬁnancially well-developed countries is twice
of that created in the ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries when the relative labor endowments
22do not diﬀer across the three groups, its is triple of that when the relative labor endowments re-
ﬂect the real world ﬁgures for the respective country groups.51 This table also allows comparison
of results with alternative absorptive capacity measures, such as the labor skills as suggested by
Borenzstein et al. (1998) and Xu (2002). Comparing the results in tables 4 and 6 one observes
that when μ =0 .2 for example, the additional growth rate generated is 0.06 for the ﬁnancially
medium developed countries. When the labor endowments of these countries decrease to the actual
level then this additional growth rate decreases to 0.05, suggesting that the 0.01 percentage points
additional growth was due to the better labor endowments. This result suggests that countries
with more skill-intensive labor endowments beneﬁt more in terms of growth eﬀects from FDI.
Alternative Measures of Productivity Gaps: So far in the analysis in setting the parameters
regarding the relative productivity of the foreign and domestic ﬁrms,
Af
φAd,w em a d eu s eo ft h e
information from macro level studies showing that the productivity diﬀerence between the industri-
alized and developing countries is approximately 2. Micro level studies provide further information
regarding the productivity diﬀerences between foreign owned and domestic owned ﬁrms. For exam-
ple, Davies and Lyons (1991) show that foreign ﬁrms are 30% more productive than their domestic
counterparts, and 18% of this is attributable to the multinational ﬁrm characteristics of the ﬁrm.
Therefore, one could argue that
Af
φAd =1 .18. In similar vein, Aitken and Harrison (1998) ﬁnd that
as a plant goes from being domestically owned to fully foreign owned then its total productivity
increases by between 10% and 16%. So, one could easily envisage
Af
φAd =1 .15. Conyon et.al. (2002)
on the other hand, show that the foreign ﬁrms in the U.K. are between 30% and 50% more pro-
ductive than the domestic ﬁrms. Finally, micro level evidence provided from Japan by Kimura and
Kiyota (2004) suggests that foreign ﬁrms are 67% to 100% more productive than domestic ﬁrms,
suggesting a relative productivity value close to that suggested by macro level studies. Given the
wide range of estimates available for the relative productivity we next allow for alternative relative
productivity values. Results reported in tables 8 and 9 start with the lowest value from the micro
evidence, namely 1.15 and allows for increments of approximately 15% change in this value. This
exercise allows us to cover a wide range of possible relative productivity measures, and not only is a
robustness check but also allows us to discuss alternative magnitudes of increased foreign presence
and alternative spillover magnitudes.
Table 8 shows the additional growth rates observed in the three groups of countries when the
technology gap among the foreign and domestic ﬁrms change. While the ﬁrst three columns reports
the results for the benchmark value for μ the robustness of the results to alternative values of μ
are also tested for in the remainder of the table. The results for the benchmark case suggest that
increments of 15% increases in the technology gap between the foreign and domestic ﬁrms creates
additional growth rates of 0.020 percentage points in the ﬁnancially well-developed countries, 0.011
percentage points in the ﬁnancially medium developed countries, and 0.06 percentage points in the
ﬁnancially poorly developed countries. For example, when the technology gap measure increases
from 1.15 to 1.32, by approximately 15%, the additional growth rates in the three countries are as
51As in the Cobb-Douglas case the robustness of the results are ensured by using alternative labor endowment
ﬁgures from Barro and Lee (1992), and Caselli and Coleman (2005). The qualitative results remain unchanged.
23reported in the previous sentence. Alternatively if the technology gap measure increases by 100%,
to 2.3, one has to look at the cumulative of the additional growth values reported in table 8. For
the ﬁnancially well-developed countries this doubling of the relative productivity measure creates
an additional 0.1 percentage point growth, while creating around 0.05 percentage point growth
in the ﬁnancially medium developed, and around 0.03 percentage point growth in the ﬁnancially
poorly-developed countries. The exercise reported in table 8 allows for replicating this exercise
for a very wide range of initial technology gap measures, as well as alternative values of extent
of spillovers. Table 9 alternatively looks into the additional growth rates due to increased foreign
presence measured through changes in μ, rather than through changes in the technology gap. The
same results prevail, where the additional growth rates are almost triple for the ﬁnancially well-
developed countries than for the ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries.
Changes in the Elasticity of Substitution: Finally, given the lack of strong evidence for the
appropriate measure of the elasticity of substitution parameter the above exercise is replicated for
values of ρ ranging from −0.9 to 0.9. Figures 1 through 6 show the nonmonotonic relationship
between ρ and the additional growth rates created by increased FDI across the three groups of
countries. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the results for the ﬁnancially well-, medium-, and poorly-
developed countries, respectively, for positive values of ρ. Similarly, ﬁgures 4, 5, and 6 show the
results for the ﬁnancially well-, medium-, and poorly-developed countries, respectively, for negative
values of ρ. An interpretation of the elasticity of substitution values suggests that as ρ increases
the domestic and foreign produced goods become more substitutable, and in such cases we observe
higher additional growth eﬀects of FDI across the board and the main hypothesis of the model
remains fully supported. The ﬁgures furthermore show that these results remain unchanged across
alternative initial values of foreign presence in the market, i.e. for alternative values of μ.
3.2 Cobb-douglas production function
This section discusses the results for the Cobb-Douglas production function (ε =1 /(1 − ρ)=1 ). As
seen in table 10, there are large diﬀerences in growth rates across groups only because of ﬁnancial
markets. Though all groups have the same FDI shares and technological gaps between the two
sectors, the countries with high levels of ﬁnancial development grow 1 percentage point faster then
the ones with medium levels of ﬁnancial development and the medium ones grow 0.8 percentage
point faster than the countries with low levels of ﬁnancial development. High ﬁnancially developed
countries grow twice as fast as the low ﬁnancially developed countries. This result holds for all
levels of φ. As institutional barriers for business fall (a decrease in φ), we see very small increases
in growth for the given level of ﬁnancial development. When barriers completely disappear, i.e. φ
goes from 2 to 1, leads to only a 0.1% increase in the growth rate. This suggest that
Af
φAd increases
do not matter much.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of increasing Af by 25% as shown in table 11. Comparing table
11 to table 10 shows very little change in growth rates. The growth rates are slightly higher for
the high and medium ﬁnancially developed countries (i.e. 2.49 vs. 2.53; 3.61 vs. 3.65). Thus it
seems the marginal eﬀect of raising Af is very small. One reason why this might be the case is
24our assumption of η =0 .95. With foreign ﬁrms producing only 5% of the total output, it would be
unreasonable to expect improvements in their productivity to have large measurable eﬀect on the
growth rate of the economy.52
In table 12, we allow human capital ratios to vary across country groups. Everything else is as
in table 10. Comparing to table 10, we see that the growth rates for medium and low ﬁnancially
developed countries decrease, whereas the rates for the high ﬁnancially developed country is the
same since the ratio for the latter is unchanged. In table 10 the countries with high levels of
ﬁnancial development grow twice as fast as the countries with low levels of ﬁnancial development.
Now this gap increased another 0.5%, which is considerable but not as big as the one caused by
ﬁnancial markets alone. Table 13 repeats the exercise of table 12 by exogenously increasing Af by
25%. Again as in the case of comparing table 10 and 11 the diﬀerences are negligible.
In tables 14, we decrease the share of the domestic ﬁrm to 75% and increase that of the foreign
ﬁrm to 25%. This probably represents an upper bound in terms of foreign ownership. Everything
else is as in table 12. Growth rates are lower for all the levels of ﬁnancial development but the
qualitative results are the same. Low ﬁnancially developed countries grow at less than third the
speed of high ﬁnancially developed countries. Also note that as φ (barriers) increase, the growth
rates are even lower within each group. In fact there is a 0.16% drop for the countries with low
levels of ﬁnancial development. This indicates that
Af
φAd ratio is more important here than it was
before. This is not surprising given that the foreign sector now has a larger share. Table 15 repeats
the same exercise with the exogenous increase in FDI. The growth rates are higher again, though
more so than the previous cases, where the increase was negligible. These ﬁndings are parallel to
the ﬁndings reported for the CES case, where the magnitude of eﬀects are much larger when the
implicit share of foreign production is higher in the domestic economy. The bottomline is that the
role of ﬁnancial market is extremely important in realizing the growth eﬀects of higher FDI. 53
4E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Domestic and Foreign Production as Perfect Substitutes
CES aggregators allow for ﬁnite elasticities of substitution. But what if the two outputs were perfect
substitutes? First of all, given the diﬀerent intensities in labor usage, perfect substitution does
not necessarily mean that either domestic or foreign ﬁrms will exist on their own. Ultimately co-
existence will be determined by the relative productivity gap and the aggregate factor endowments,
and diﬀerences in the magnitudes of production function parameters.
52Recall that in line with the micro- empirical evidence, our model captures externality eﬀe c tv i al i n k a g e sa n dn o t
through other form of spillovers.
53We also did the same exercises using two other measures of ﬁnancial development. We use overhead costs and
the net interest margin. Overhead costs are deﬁned as the accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of
its total costs and net interest margin is deﬁn e da st h ea c c o u n t i n gv a l u eo fb a n k ’ sn e ti n t e r e s tr e v e n u ea sas h a r eo f
its interest- bearing (total earning) assets. The qualitative results remain unchanged. The results are also robust to
alternative measures of relative labor endowments, for which we used relative labor endowments suggested by Barro
and Lee, 1992 and Caselli and Coleman, 2005. Finally, the results are also robust to alternative values of the free
parameter, a.
25Perfect substitutes, is of course a special case of the CES with ρ → 1 (and for simplicity assume
that μ =1too). In this situation it easier to bypass the aggregator (since both products will
have the same price and are indistinguishable) and simply assume that they both trade in the
international market with the world price normalized to 1.
In this case, we obtain the following expression for foreign production,
P ˜ Yf =
(βd + λδα)˜ wsH − (γd + λ(1 − δ)α)˜ wuL
(1 − λ + αλ)(βd − βf)
(41)
and the following expression for the domestic production,
P ˜ Yd =
(γf + αλ(1 − δ)) ˜ wuL − (βf + λδα)˜ wsH
(1 − λ + αλ)(βd − βf)
(42)
While we do not go into the details, observe that for both equations to be positive, the parameters
must satisfy certain conditions. Summing these two equations, (41) and (42), and using the fact
that (γf − γd)=( βd − βf), we can rewrite total ﬁnal good production in the economy as,
P ˜ Yd + P ˜ Yf =
(γf − γd)˜ wuL +( βd − βf)˜ wsH
(1 − λ + αλ)(βd − βf)
=
˜ wuL +˜ wsH
(1 − λ + αλ)
(43)
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Improvements in the level of ﬁnancial market development (i.e. reductions in i)h a v ec l e a r
positive eﬀects on the growth rate. How does a change in φ, which in our setup corresponds
to changes in the presence of multinational ﬁrms in the economy, aﬀect the growth rate of the
economy? In order to perform this exercise, we need to solve for the eﬀect of changes in φ on
˜ wu and ˜ ws. Looking at the reduced form factor price equations, we know that the eﬀect of φ is
opposite of that of Af.A n i n c r e a s e i n Af raises the skilled wage per eﬃciency unit and reduces
the unskilled wage per eﬃciency unit as long as multinationals use skills more intensively, that is
γf >γ d. This is because a rise in the technology of the skill intensive sector, raises the demand for
skills more than it raises the demand for raw labor. As a result this creates an upward pressure on
skilled labor wages. This suggests that the overall eﬀect can be ambiguous. Moreover, the eﬀect of
changes in φ depends also upon the relative stocks of L and H in the economy. If the increase in
skilled labor wage bill more than compensates the reduction in unskilled labor wage bill then the
growth rate of the economy will go up. Thus even the skill intensive nature of FDI is not suﬃcient
to ensure that more FDI leads to higher growth rates in the economy. If it does raise the growth
rate then clearly both sectors experience increases in growth rates. This would then be the case of
ab e n e ﬁcial spillover eﬀect. On the other hand, if the increase in skilled wages does not compensate
the reduction in unskilled wages, then the growth rates will diminish. In this case FDI would have
26a negative impact in the economy.54 Of course the opposite happens if Ad increases.
Returning to the innovation in the economy, let ˜ K = K/n1−θ be the capital stock adjusted for
eﬃciency units. Using the equation (23), ˙ n = K
a nθ, and equation (44), g = K
an1−θ,w ec a nr e w r i t e
the previous expression as ˜ K = ag. Thus capital for innovation is given by,
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And the capital stock to output ratio is given by,
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(1 − λ + αλ)
(˜ wuL +˜ wsH)
(46)
T h e r e f o r et h ew o r l di n t e r e s tr a t eh a st w on e g a t i v ee ﬀects on this ratio. First of all, indirectly,
by raising the borrowing rate (i), it raises the cost of the only input used in the innovation pricess
and secondly, directly, it raises the opportunity cost (since entrepreneurs may now instead simply
lend their resources rather than invest in the ﬁrm). However, the level of development of ﬁnancial
market intermediation aﬀects only the ﬁrst of these since it only alters i.
Notice also that solving for the relative shares of domestic and foreign output, P ˜ Yd and P ˜ Yf,




(βd + λδα)˜ wsH − (γd + λ(1 − δ)α)˜ wuL
(γf + αλ(1 − δ)) ˜ wuL − (βf + λδα)˜ wsH
(47)
We can analyze the eﬀect of a decrease in φ or an increase in Af on these shares of output.
Given the assumption (γf >γ d), such changes will raise ˜ ws and reduce ˜ wu. This will clearly raise
the numerator and reduce the denominator in the previous expression leading to a higher share of
foreign output. An increase in FDI (lower φ) lowers domestic output. In any case, even if domestic
output level is lowered, this is not necessarily true in the long run. In the long run, both domestic
and foreign output grow at the same rate which is ˙ n
n.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Although there is a widespread belief among policymakers that foreign direct investment (FDI)
generates positive productivity externalities for host countries, the empirical evidence on the exis-
tence of positive productivity externalities is sobering. Both macro and micro empirical literatures
either ﬁnd no eﬀect of FDI on host countries ﬁrms productivity and/or aggregate growth or they
ﬁnd negative eﬀects. The theoretical models of FDI, on the other hand implies that FDI is good
for the host country’s development.
In this paper we try to bridge this gap between the theoretical and the empirical literatures by
proposing a novel mechanism through which foreign direct investment (FDI) leads to higher growth.
54Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999) also get ambiguous results in terms of the eﬀects of
multinationals in the domestic economy stemming from reduction in the demand for local inputs due as foreign ﬁrms
may import inputs or competition in the labor market with local ﬁrms.
27We model a small open economy, where foreign and domestic ﬁrms both produce in the ﬁnal good
sector and compete for skilled labor, unskilled labor, and intermediate products. Production of
intermediate goods is carried out by local entrepreneurs in a monopolistically competitive market.
To operate a ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst develop a new variety of
intermediate good. Innovation requires capital costs, which must be ﬁnanced through the domestic
ﬁnancial institutions. If the local ﬁnancial markets are developed enough they can allow credit
constrained entrepreneurs to start their own ﬁrms. Thus the number of varieties of intermediate
goods increases, causing positive spillovers to the ﬁnal goods sector. As a result the host country
beneﬁts from the backward linkages between the foreign and domestic ﬁrms since the local ﬁnancial
markets allow these linkages to turn into FDI spillovers. Our calibration exercise conﬁrms our
analytical results. For the same level of FDI, countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets
tend to have signiﬁcantly higher growth rates and for sizeable increases in the productivity of FDI,
the increase in the aggregate growth rate is higher for economies with more developed ﬁnancial
markets. In particular, the results show that the same amount of increase in FDI, regardless of the
reason of the increase, generates three times more additional growth in ﬁnancially well-developed
countries than in ﬁnancially poorly-developed countries.
We have focussed on only one kind of spillover. In practice, there are likely to be additional
spillovers and technology transfers which would make the eﬀects in our model only a lower bound.
Besides, our results are based on a model that takes FDI as given. The decision of a ﬁrm to
outsource or invest abroad (and the potential to generate linkages) may depend on the conditions
of the country and on the characteristics of the ﬁrm.55
55See Antras and Helpman (2004); Antras (2005).
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33A Modelling Financial Markets
We present a bare-bones model of imperfect ﬁnancial markets using the costly state veriﬁcation
approach. The model is adapted from King and Levine (1993).56 As in their model we assume
individuals have equal ﬁnancial wealth which is a claim on proﬁts of a diversiﬁed portfolio of
ﬁrms engaged in innovative activity. Some individuals do have the ability to manage innovation
but this does not lead them to accumulate diﬀerent levels of wealth from the rest of individuals
in the economy. These potential entrepreneurs have the ability to successfully manage a project
with probability α. These abilities are unobservable to both the entrepreneur and the ﬁnancial
intermediary. However, the actual capability of such an individual to manage a project can be
ascertained at a cost, F.57 The main two diﬀerences are the following. First, consistent with our
setup, we use capital in the R&D sector instead of labor. The second diﬀerence is related to our
assumption regarding the structure of veriﬁcation costs. We assume these costs to be proportional
to the set up costs for any project. The main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to retain
the balanced growth properties of the model while allowing in principle to make total veriﬁcation
costs decreasing in the level of overall technology and hence in the level of development.58 Therefore
one could argue that our setup relates automatically more eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets to higher levels
of development.59
We depart from the main text in that now innovation and imitation projects are potentially risky
and there is a probability α of the project being run successfully. Which potential entrepreneur
will manage a project successfully is unknown both to the entrepreneur and the intermediary. The
intermediary can spend an amount F to reduce the uncertainty regarding the project’s outcome.




Therefore since setup costs require a
nθ units of K then the cost of veriﬁcation simply is propor-
tional to total setup costs and f represents that factor of proportionality. While not necessary for
our model, it seems intuitive that f should be less than 1–veriﬁcation costs are likely to be lower
than setup costs.
If the value of a successful project is q then, with a competitive intermediation sector, in
equilibrium we must have,60
56See Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) for an alternative modelling strategy for imperfect ﬁnancial markets
in an endogenous growth model. In their model, entrepreneurs can pay an upfront cost and defraud the lenders.
Incentive compatibility constraints and arbitrage conditions then leads to an upper bound on how much is actually
invested in new innovations which is lower than the optimal investment amount. The gap between the two is an
inverse function of the degree of creditor protection. Their model seems more suited to “quality ladder” Schumpeterian
models whereas the King and Levine structure is more easily incorporated into a product variety setup such as ours.
57Obviously entrepreneurs cannot evaluate themselves and credibly communicate the results to others.
58Indeed King and Levine (1993) suggest this modiﬁcation as a potentially useful extension of their model (pp 518).
59The objective of our paper, as mentioned, is not to model the relation between ﬁnancial markets and development
but instead the role of ﬁnancial markets in allowing an economy to reap the beneﬁts of potential FDI spillovers.
60Of course in the background we assume that for an intermediary it is better to do this evaluation rather than
simply lending the money and not incurring the veriﬁcation cost.
34αq = F
The value of a successful project is simply the present discounted value of proﬁts (v) minus the
set up costs (η). Therefore the above condition can be rewritten as,
a(v − η)=F







































































where ˜ Yi = Yi/n1−θ.



























α is likely to be unobservable across countries. Therefore in the numerical
exercises, when we use the spread, theoretically, we are measuring r
f
α. Therefore a higher spread
has the same eﬀect as a higher veriﬁcation costs. Further, for every unique f, given r and α, there
is a unique value of the spread. Therefore using the spread between lending and borrowing rates
serves as a convenient proxy for veriﬁcation costs.
B Solving the Model with a CES Aggregator














































⇒ pd = pd (pf) (54)
(βd + δαλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ wu
+
(βf + δαλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ wu
= L (55)
(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ ws
+
(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ ws
= H (56)










We next list the steps involved in arriving at a solution for this setup:
1) First of all note that we can use equations (51) and (52) to express eﬃciency wages as a
function of the prices of foreign and domestic goods,





























































Dividing equation (55) by (56):
⇒
(βd + δαλ)+( βf + δαλ)
pf ˜ Yf
pd ˜ Yd



















Substituting this into equation(61):























Further using equation (60),


































1−ε = pd, we can rewrite the expression above to obtain,
⇒













































Thus solving for pf = p∗
f where ∗ denotes the solved value






1−ε to back out pd
3) Since we now have both p∗
d and p∗
f, we can also derive the eﬃciency wages, and also the
relative outputs.
37To derive the eﬃciency wages substitute prices into equations (58) and (59), as to rewrite them
such that we have ˜ w∗
u =˜ w∗
u(pd,p f) and ˜ w∗
s =˜ w∗

































































































5) Now take either of the two labor market constraint equations. Let’s take the unskilled labor
market equation (55)
(βd + δαλ)p∗
d˜ Yd +( βf + δαλ)p∗
f ˜ Yf =˜ w∗
uL
⇒ (βd + δαλ)p∗







⇒ ˜ Yd = ˜ Y ∗
d
6) We can now use substitute this into equation (65) and get
˜ Y ∗
f .


















38C Solving for the Cobb Douglas Case















































(βd + δαλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ wu
+
(βf + δαλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ wu
= L (70)
(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)pd˜ Yd
˜ ws
+
(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)pf ˜ Yf
˜ ws
= H (71)





Substituting this into equations (70) and (71) and further rearrangment gives us:
µ
η(βd + δαλ)+( βf + δαλ)
(1 − η)
¶
pf ˜ Yf =˜ wuL (72)
µ
η(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)+( 1− η)(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)
(1 − η)
¶
pf ˜ Yf =˜ wsH (73)





η(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)+( 1− η)(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)



































39Therefore to solve for the endogenous rate of growth of varieties we simply need to ﬁgure out
pf ˜ Yf . This in turn requires us to ﬁgure out either ˜ wsH(equation (73)) or ˜ wuL(equation (72))61.












Similarly, to solve for ˜ ws and ˜ wu, equations (66), (66) can be rewritten such that we have
˜ wu =˜ wu(pd,p f) and ˜ ws =˜ ws(pd,p f). More explicitly, after some tedious rearrangements, we get,














Note that these are exactly the same as the corresponding CES equations (63) and (64),
We can use these expressions for eﬃciency wages and substitute them into equation (74) and















η(γd +( 1− δ)αλ)+( 1− η)(γf +( 1− δ)αλ)





Therefore we have the relative prices completely in terms of exogenous variables. As expected,
the prices are inversely related to the relative TFP’s of the sectors. Further as long as γf >γ d
(share of H is greater in the foreign sector), an decrease in the L/H ratio leads to a decrease in
relative prices. As human capital becomes relatively more abundant, the sector that uses this more
intensively beneﬁts more from the lower cost and therefore charges a lower price. Finally we can
use equation (69) in conjunction with (80) to solve explicity for pf and pd. Once we have these two
solutions, we can substitute them back into equation (78) and (79) and derive the explicit values for










































61Given the symmetric nature of Cobb Douglas Production functions, ultimately it does not matter which one we
proceed with.
40where























Ψβ = η (βd + δλ)+( 1− η)(βf + δλ)
Ψγ = η(γd +( 1− δ)λ)+( 1− η)(γf +( 1− δ)λ)
(Note that Ψβ + Ψγ =1 )
To derive the growth rate we need ˜ wsH,












and this can be substituted back into equation (77) to derive ˙ n
n.
41Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Common parameters for three groups
α =0 .91 r =0 .05 φ =1
Production Function Parameters
βd =0 .34 βf =0 .27 γ =0 .5
γd =0 .33 γf =0 .40 Af/Ad =2




High (rich) 0.045 5
Medium (middle) 0.085 9
Low (poor) 0.145 12
Notes: We group countries based on their ﬁnancial market development levels, using the interest
rate spreads. The average spread for the low ﬁnancially developed (poor) countries, medium ﬁ-
nancially developed (middle income) countries and the high ﬁnancially developed (rich) countries
between 2000 and 2003 are 14.5%, 8.5%, and 4.5%, respectively. Following Duﬀy et al. (2004), we
set the ratio of unskilled labor to skilled labor equal to 12 for the poor countries, 9 for the middle
income countries, and 5 for the rich countries.
42Table 2: Benchmark Results
Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate Relative Relative
High Financial Medium Financial Low Financial Output Wage
μ Development Development Development (Y f/Y d) (wu/ws)
0.1 3.10 2.13 1.42 0.065 0.201
0.2 4.35 3.01 2.03 0.155 0.196
0.3 6.17 4.29 2.92 0.257 0.192
0.4 8.74 6.10 4.17 0.369 0.189
0.5 12.25 8.57 5.88 0.487 0.186
0.6 16.97 11.89 8.18 0.612 0.183
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. Growth rates are in percent. Relative outputs are
valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments are constant at the level of rich
(high ﬁnancial development) countries.
43Table 3: Increasing Foreign Presence, Changing μ
Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Percent
High Financial Medium Financial Low Financial Relative Output Change in
∆μ Development Development Development ∆(Y f/Y d) Y f
0.1 to 0.2 1.25 0.88 0.61 0.09 203.2
0.2 to 0.3 1.83 1.29 0.89 0.10 114.1
0.3 to 0.4 2.56 1.80 1.25 0.11 84.8
0.4 to 0.5 3.51 2.47 1.71 0.12 69.6
0.5 to 0.6 4.72 3.32 2.30 0.12 59.9
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported
otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments
are constant at the level of rich (high ﬁnancial development) countries.
44Table 4: Increasing Foreign Presence via Increasing MNE Productivity, ∆Af/Ad = 15%
Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Percent
High Financial Medium Financial Low Financial Relative Output Change in
μ Development Development Development ∆(Y f/Y d) Y f
0.1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.002 4.2
0.2 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.006 5.0
0.3 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.009 5.8
0.4 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.013 6.6
0.5 0.59 0.41 0.29 0.017 7.2
0.6 0.94 0.66 0.46 0.022 7.8
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported
otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments
are constant at the level of rich (high ﬁnancial development) countries.
45Table 5: Increasing Foreign Activity v i aI n c r e a s i n gM N EP r o d c u t i v i t y ,∆Af/Ad = 15% and Chang-
ing the Cost of Doing Business
Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Percent
High Financial Medium Financial Low Financial Relative Output Change in
φ Development Development Development ∆(Y f/Y d) Y f
1 0.029 0.020 0.014 0.002 104
1.1 0.028 0.020 0.014 0.002 104
1.2 0.027 0.019 0.013 0.002 104
1.3 0.026 0.019 0.013 0.002 104
1.4 0.026 0.018 0.013 0.002 104
1.5 0.025 0.018 0.012 0.002 104
1.6 0.025 0.017 0.012 0.002 104
1.7 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.002 104
1.8 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.002 104
1.9 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.002 104
2 0.023 0.016 0.011 0.002 104
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported
otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments
are constant at the level of rich (high ﬁnancial development) countries.
46Table 6: Increasing Foreign Activit yv i aI n c r e a s i n gM N EP r o d u c t i v i t y∆Af/Ad = 15%,a n dL / H
varies by Group
∆∆∆∆∆∆ % ∆ % ∆ % ∆
Growth Growth Growth Y f/Y d Y f/Y d Y f/Y d Y f Y f Y f
μ High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 0.1
0.1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.002 4.23 4.23 4.22
0.2 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.006 0.005 0.005 5.04 5.03 5.02
0.3 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.009 0.009 0.009 5.83 5.81 5.80
0.4 0.35 0.19 0.12 0.013 0.013 0.013 6.56 6.56 6.52
0.5 0.59 0.33 0.20 0.017 0.017 0.017 7.21 7.19 7.18
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported
otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments
change together with ﬁnancial development as high, medium, low.
47Table 7: Increasing Foreign Presence via Increasing MNE Productivity ∆Af/Ad =1 5 % ,,a n dL / H
varies by Group
∆∆∆ ∆∆∆ % ∆ % ∆ % ∆
Growth Growth Growth Y f/Y d Y f/Y d Y f/Y d Y f Y f Y f
∆μ High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 0.1 to 0.2
0.1 to 0.2 1.25 0.70 0.43 0.09 0.09 0.09 203.2 202.5 202.2
0.2 to 0.3 1.83 1.02 0.62 0.10 0.10 0.10 114.1 113.6 113.4
0.3 to 0.4 2.56 1.43 0.87 0.11 0.19 0.11 84.8 84.4 84.2
0.4 to 0.5 3.51 1.96 1.19 0.12 0.12 0.12 69.6 69.2 69.1
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported
otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor endowments
change together with ﬁnancial development as high, medium, low.
48Table 8: Increasing Foreign Activity for diﬀerent levels of Foreign Presence
∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
∆ High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low
Af/Ad μ =0 .1 μ =0 .1 μ =0 .1 μ =0 .2 μ =0 .2 μ =0 .2 μ =0 .3 μ =0 .3 μ =0 .3 1.15 to
1.15 to
1.32 0.02 0.010 0.006 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.04
1.52 0.02 0.003 0.002 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.01
1.75 0.02 0.002 0.001 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.01
2.0 0.02 0.011 0.006 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.04
2.3 0.02 0.011 0.007 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.05
2.6 0.02 0.010 0.006 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.04
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported otherwise.
The relative labor endowments change together with ﬁnancial development as high, medium, low.
49Table 9: Increasing Foreign Presence for diﬀerent levels of Foreign Activity
∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low
Af/Ad ∆μ 0.1 ∆μ 0.1 ∆μ 0.1 ∆μ 0.2 ∆μ 0.2 ∆μ 0.2 ∆μ 0.3 ∆μ 0.3 ∆μ 0.3
to 0.2 to 0.2 to 0.2 to 0.3 to 0.3 to 0.3 to 0.4 to 0.4 to 0.4 1.15
1.15 1.05 0.59 0.36 1.49 0.83 0.51 2.03 1.14 0.69
1.32 1.09 0.61 0.38 1.56 0.88 0.54 2.15 1.20 0.73
1.52 1.14 0.64 0.39 1.65 0.92 0.56 2.28 1.27 0.78
1.75 1.20 0.67 0.41 1.74 0.97 0.59 2.42 1.35 0.83
2.00 1.25 0.70 0.43 1.83 1.02 0.62 2.56 1.43 0.87
2.30 1.31 0.73 0.45 1.93 1.08 0.66 2.72 1.52 0.93
2.60 1.36 0.76 0.47 2.02 1.13 0.69 2.87 1.60 0.98
Notes: See table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported otherwise.
The relative labor endowments change together with ﬁnancial development as high, medium, low.
50Table 10: Benchmark Growth Rates
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 1.67 1.66 1.65 1.63 1.61
Medium 2.49 2.47 2.46 2.43 2.40
High 3.61 3.59 3.57 3.53 3.48
51Table 11: An Increase in MNE Productivity, Af =2 .5Ad
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 1.69 1.68 1.67 1.65 1.63
Medium 2.52 2.50 2.49 2.46 2.43
High 3.65 3.63 3.61 3.57 3.52
52Table 12: Changing the L/H Ratios
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.13 1.11
Medium 1.98 1.97 1.96 1.94 1.91
High 3.61 3.59 3.57 3.53 3.48
53Table 13: An Increase in MNE Productivity, Af =2 .5Ad; L/H Ratios varies by Group
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.13
Medium 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.96 1.93
High 3.65 3.63 3.61 3.57 3.52
54Table 14: Changing the MNE share to 25% from 5%; L/H Ratios varies by Group
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.69
Medium 1.49 1.46 1.42 1.33 1.23
High 2.78 2.71 2.64 2.49 2.31
55Table 15: MNC share is 25%, An Increase in MNE Productivity, Af =2 .5Ad,a n dL / HR a t i o s
varies by Group
Financial φ =1 φ =1 .1 φ =1 .2 φ =1 .5 φ =2
Development
Low 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.74
Medium 1.59 1.55 1.51 1.42 1.31




















Table 1: Financially well-developed, positive rho  
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Figure 6: Financially poorly-developed, negative rho
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